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The Rise of Technology and its Influence on Labor Market Outcomes
Maja Thomas
Abstract: Technological progress has significantly changed the inputs and production processes
utilized by firms. Such shifts have led to warnings throughout the past few decades that
substantial numbers of jobs, particularly things belonging to the middle class, would be
eliminated and replaced by technology. This paper examines the validity of this argument by
estimating the impact of technology investment on local labor markets during that period. I find
evidence for a positive, rather than negative, relationship between technology and employment.
Furthermore, my estimates suggest there exists a complementary relationship between
technology investment and growth in labor opportunities, rather than a substitution effect of
workers moving from technology-intensive industries to non-technology intensive sectors
Introduction
The rise of technology, specifically robotics and computerization, has dramatically
shifted the inputs available to businesses over the past several decades. This rapid development
has transformed the production processes for many different industries. Many fear that this
technological development has increased automation while not adding enough jobs to offset the
drop in opportunities. If true, this decrease in the employment capacity would negatively impact
the wages and incomes of many workers, namely middle skill white collar and blue collar labors
performing easily codifiable tasks (Autor 2011).
The subject of automation and its expansion in recent decades has ignited fears and
frustrations over its threat of making many traditional jobs obsolete. Automation has been used
as anecdotal evidence to explain claims of declining productivity, employment, and the current
economic slow growth. The impact of automation has discriminately hit certain industries and
job types, most of which are middle-paying and moderate-skilled, while straying away from
others (Autor 2011). Much of this is because automation is only viable for certain job types, most
of which are middle-paying and moderate-skilled. The core tasks of these positions often require
employees to follow precise methodical procedures which machines are well equipped to
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perform. But is the rise in technology to blame for labor market perils or has it simply provided a
digestible narrative?
Per neoclassical theory, investment would actually increase labor demand due to the
complementary nature of labor and capital. However, many economists consider ICT capital
differently, worrying that investment would decrease the demand for labor by increasing
productivity of labor. Nevertheless, with spillover effects on other industries, incomes, or
aggregate demand (and thus output), the impact of ICT investment is difficult to assess per
traditional theory.
Thus, this paper answers this question empirically, examining the impact of technology
investment on local labor markets. In the next section, I discuss the influence of robotics and job
automation on employment dynamics. In section III, I develop an econometric model to analyze
the relationship between increases the level of information and communications technology
investment within a commuting zone and the expected level of employment in that county. In
section IV, I discuss the data collected to test my hypothesis, and in section V, I use that data to
test my hypothesis and find evidence for a positive relationship between investment and
employment.
I.

Job Automation and Labor Market Demand
The interaction between job automation and labor market dynamics has attracted

significant attention from both economists and scholars alike. With vast technological advances
occurring in computing and robotics, machines have now become as or more efficient than
human workers in various environments. Without a clear consensus, economists continue to
question automation’s bearing on the labor market while the public remains largely in fear.
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A negative relationship between the levels of ICT investment and employment would
hardly be surprising. Since the rise of machines and machine learning, many have feared that
robots would replace human labor, leading to employment losses. Straying from traditional
neoclassical framework, economists tend to view ICT investment as a substitute for labor rather
than a compliment. In this case, demand for labor would decrease, thereby reducing
employment. Furthermore, while decreases in job opportunities due to automation could
hypothetically be made up by increases in job opportunities in other industries, labor may not be
able to shift into these new opportunities due to a lack of experience or other structural problems,
thus leading to structural unemployment and an overall decline in employment. These findings
would uphold implications from the Solow growth model, where an increase in technological
investment increases labor productivity (i.e. output per worker). Ceteris paribus, firms would
need less employees and would be incentivized to cut jobs.
This negative relationship between technology investment and labor has been
documented by different parts of the literature. Robots and automated systems have negatively
impacted several occupations, almost entirely eliminating elevator operators, highway toll
collectors, parking attendants, and other similar roles (Quereshi and Syed 2014). Qureshi and
Syed found that in the health care industry, 19 Aethon TUG robots can perform $1 million in
human labor each year for $350,000, saving the industry 65% in labor costs. Robots such as
these, in working two shifts seven days per week, save the labor of 2.8 full time equivalent (FTE)
employees while costing less than one. Ebel (1986) also noted the labor costs savings by
employing robots. Robots in the automotive industry costs around $6 per hour including
depreciation and maintenance costs, compared with between $23 and $24 an hour in wages and
benefits for an employee.
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Contradicting evidence would demonstrate either no significant relationship or a positive
relationship between the commuting zone levels of ICT investment and employment. If there
were no significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables, job losses
would either not result from automation or losses would be made up by gains in other sectors or
occupations. If there were a significant and positive relationship, commuting zone job growth
would result from ICT investment due to aggregate demand effects. This would align with
neoclassical theory, which states that an increase in ITC investment would increase labor
demand because capital and labor are complements. Higher investment would increase
production, leading to an increase in income and increase the demand for goods and services,
overall employing more individuals to produce these goods and services. Additionally, if demand
for output increased because of the technological investment, a decrease in employment resulting
from increases in labor productivity would be offset by an increase in labor demanded to
increase total output. Even if ICT investment and labor were substitutes, there could be spillover
effects (i.e. increases in demand for labor in related industries, impacts of increased income or
aggregate demand, etc.) which could increase employment overall.
Other parts of the literature have found ICT investment to have had a non-negative
impact on the labor market, largely due to spillover effects of ICT investment. Autor (2015)
found that automation had not led to significant job losses, citing that the interaction between
technology and employment required ingenuity and creative thinking that cannot be adequately
computerized. Autor (2011) detailed growing labor market opportunities for both high skill,
high-wage and low skill, low-wage white and blue collar industries, as a result of automation-led
wage-level occupational shifts. As computer and robotics technologies progressed, machines
were well equipped to perform core job tasks of middle skilled industries. However, this has
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caused various spillover effects and led to increases in opportunities in other sectors, and likely
triggered dramatic growth in service occupations as detailed by Autor and Dorn (2013). Such
also appeared the case during the early 2000s, where Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigo (2016)
found that the declines in the manufacturing industry were propped up by the growth in the
housing sector, which benefitted from the decreases in construction costs and increases in
building efficiency. Leontif and Duchin (1984) forecasted the intensive use of automation the
twenty years following 1985, estimating it would conserve about 10% of the labor force required
to produce the same goods. However, their models predicted an increase in the output level
which would offset the effects of job displacement, finding a complementary relationship
between investment and employment as would the neoclassical framework. Furthermore, they
argued the impacts would involve a significant increase in professional employees and a steep
decline in the relative number of clerical workers as a proportion of the labor force.
An even smaller proportion of the literature has found no relationship between ICT
investment and the labor market. Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) found that time series results
demonstrated little correlation between the adoption of technology and changes in workforce
characteristics. The adoption of new technologies did not appear to impact a factory’s relative
share of non-production labor or high wage workers, as compared to plants which did not adopt
new technologies. This relationship between factory automation technologies and employment of
highly paid workers was further established by Dunne and Schmitz (1995) and Siegel (1995).
Thus, the impact of ICT investment on labor markets could reasonably be either positive
or negative. This paper aims to answer the empirical question of ICT investment’s impact on the
change in employment, differing from the above literature which addresses similar questions
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utilizing historical data and qualitative methods. Further information on the model is detailed in
the next section.
II.

Modeling
I test whether information and communications technology investment in a commuting

zone affects the level of employment in that commuting zone using methods similar to those of
Autor et al (2015). Commuting zones are clusters of US counties characterized by strong withincluster and weak between-cluster ties that have been compiled by the Economic Research
Service in 1990. The average level of information and communications technology investment is
computed annually over the course of two eight year periods: 1992-1999 and 2000-2007.
The benchmark regression can be written as follows:
ܻܱܮܲܯܧǡ௧ ൌ  ߚ   ߚଵ  ܶܵܧܸܰܫ୧୲  ߚଶ ܻܴܣܧ௧  ߚଷ ܴܱܰܫܩܧ௧   ߤ௧

where;
o EMPLOY measures the level of employment within each commuting zone as a
percentage of total employment;
o INVEST represents the average level of information and communications
technology investment over two eight year periods, 1992-1999 and 2000-2007,
respectively, as a percentage of total investment;
o YEAR is a dummy variablse controlling for differences in employment growth
among the two eight-year periods;
o REGION is a vector of dummy variable controlling for differences in
employment among census divisions;
o ߤ is the error term.

From the above regression, the null hypothesis for this model can be written as follows:
H0: ߚଵ  Ͳ
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An increase in the level of information and communications technology
investment within a commuting zone does not negatively impact the level of
employment in that commuting zone.
HA: ߚଵ ൏ Ͳ
An increase in the level of information and communications technology
investment within a commuting zone negatively impacts the level of employment
in that commuting zone.
III.

Data
The data in this study comes from the European Union level analysis of Capital, Labor,

Energy, Materials, and Service (EU KLEMS) and David Autor, Daron Acemoglu, and David
Dorn. The unit of analysis in this data set is commuting zone-year (e.g. commuting zone 1002007) and the data is compiled in the years 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. The EU KLEMS data
measures information and communication technology investment and is part of a larger dataset
which includes other variables related to capital, labor, and output from the 1970s to 2007. The
Autor et al dataset was the focus of their 2015 paper and includes commuting zone-level data on
employment and import penetration in the years 1991, 1999, 2007, and 2011. The data used in
this analysis includes their 722 commuting zones and encompasses the entire mainland United
States for the years 1999 through 2007. These commuting zones are clusters of counties with
strong internal commuting ties (Autor 2014). The data sets utilized in creation of this study are
codified by industry and year. Autor employs SIC codes to signify industry type, while EU
KLEMS uses broad sector categories. Thus, to combine the data sets, I recode all SIC codes into
broad sector categories for ease of merging.
My dependent variable is the change in commuting zone employment. As noted above,
commuting zones are clusters of US counties characterized by strong within-cluster and weak
between-cluster ties that have been compiled by the Economic Research Service in 1990.
Employment is defined as the number of employees who are on payroll in the pay period in
9

March of each year. Paid employees consist of full time employees, part time employees,
employees on sick leave, holidays, or vacations. The data used to construct this variable come
from David Autor and the County Business Patterns series from the United States Census. I
utilize industry level employment data within each commuter zone and year and manipulate it to
construct my dependent variable. I start by finding total employment within each commuting
zone by coding a new variable adding each industry together within a commuting zone and
removing duplicate observations, leaving only commuter zone and year. This value is then
divided by number of working age individuals in each commuter zone to construct an
employment-population ratio. I then construct a new variable measuring the change in the
employment population ratio for my two years, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007, which will represent
1999 and 2007, respectively. The data includes 1444 observations ranging from -.093% to
2.697% of total employment across all commuting zones.
The independent variable in this study is the percentage of information and
communication technology, as a share of total investment, within a commuting zone.
Information and communications technology (ICT) is a broad category of technology and can be
used as a proxy for robot-type capital. Calculation of ICT capital is based on the database
described in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) and sourced from EU KLEMS. The independent
variable is constructed by taking the eight-year average of EU KLEMS’ ICT as a percentage of
total investment from years 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Next, I create a variable representing
employment share of each industry within each commuting zone by dividing industry
employment by total employment within the commuting zone. I then multiply the average ICT
investment by employment share. Finally, I sum the industries to create a weighted average of
ICT investment in each commuting zone and eight-year period. The finalized variable includes
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1444 observations ranging between 9.57% and 23.21% of total investment across all commuting
zones. The correlation coefficient between the independent and dependent variables is -0.2718,
demonstrating a negative relationship between ICT investment and employment and following
the narrative that increases in automation remove jobs from the labor market without adding
sufficient new opportunities.
Nine control variables are utilized in this model: one dummy variable accounting for
changes in employment level due to time period and eight other dummy variables accounting for
changes in employment level due
to geographic region (see Figure 1).
These variables are coded either '0’
or ‘1’. The year dummy is coded
‘1’ for observations which take
place in 1999 and ‘0’ for
observations in 2007. Each
regional dummy is coded ‘0’ if the
commuting zone is not part of that
geographic region and ‘1’ if it is.
No commuting zone can belong to

Figure 1: US Census Divisions
Figure courtesy of the US Energy Information Administration (eia.gov)

more than one geographic region. The Mountain region is omitted in the regression analysis,
leaving a variable to compare the other regions to. A summary of all variables and their
respective descriptive statistics can be seen in the appendix in Table 1.
IV.

Findings
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V.

Appendix Tables 3 and 4

display the results of the models
constructed in this paper; that is, the
impact of an increase in the level of ICT
investment within a commuting zone on
the expected level of employment in that
county using an ordinary least squares

Figure 2: ICT Investment and Employment Relationship

(OLS) regression. At a first glance, there is a substantially negative relationship between
the two, as seen in the scatterplot in Figure 2.
The correlation coefficient is -.2718, again
demonstrating the negative relationship between
the ICT investment and the change in
employment. However, as you I add in control
variables such as year, there emerges, if
anything, a positive relationship. This is
supported by the results of the scatterplots on the left in Figures 3 and 4, where the data is
separated out by year. In the period from 1991 to 1999, there exists a positive
relationship (correlation coefficient of 0.2373) between the level of ICT investment and
the change in employment, which is likely due to the economic boom of the 1990s.
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Then, through the 2000s the relationship becomes slightly negative (correlation
coefficient of -.0809) and less uniform as the market gears up for the Great Recession.
Additionally, the summary statistics (see Table 2) show a higher average change in
employment during the 1991-1999 period (5.90% versus 0.22%) and lower average ICT
investment levels in 1991-1999 than the following eight year period (14.32% versus
16.21%).
While the first glance correlation coefficient supports my hypothesis, the first OLS model
does not; I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis and cannot conclude that there exists a
negative relationship between ICT investment and employment. The results of the model (see
Table 3a) indicate that there is actually a positive relationship between ICT investment and
employment, although they are not significant at the 5% level. But let us not fetishize the 5%
level—with a p-value of 0.063 we hold reasonably the same assurance in the coefficient as we
would if it were 0.05 or under. These findings suggest that a one-percent increase in the level of
ICT investment within a commuting zone, as a percentage of total investment, would lead to a
0.168% increase in the expected change in
Figure 3: ICT Investment and Employment Relationship,
1991-1999

employment-population ratio in that commuting
zone. These findings dispel fears of
technological unemployment and the narrative
of robots taking human jobs, proving consistent
with the complementarities between ICT
investment and human labor. However, the
small size of the coefficient and borderline
Figure 4: ICT Investment and Employment Relationship,
2000-2007

13

significance of its p-value may also be in accordance with Autor’s (2015) findings that there
exists no significant negative relationship between automation and job losses.
I implement various controls for year and region in the model. The regions are comprised
of the following divisions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, south Atlantic, East North Central, West
North Central, East South Central, West South Central, and Pacific. Of the nine control variables
tested in this model, eight are significant below the 5% level: year, New England, Mid Atlantic,
South Atlantic, East North Central, South North Central, West South Central, and Pacific. All
control variables hold negative coefficients except year. This relationship between year and
employment supports the results of the earlier correlation coefficients and scatter plots,
suggesting that employment was expected to be 6% higher in the period from 1991-1999,
regardless of region or ICT investment level.
From the results of the first model, I create a second model to include Autor’s (2014)
import penetration variable to account for differences arising from trade, and assess whether it
was an important omitted variable in the first model (see Table 3b). Upon running the mode, I
find that the change in import penetration, while significant and negative (as in Autor’s findings),
does not substantially change the ICT investment coefficient. The coefficient lowers slightly to
0.160 and keeps significance at the 10% level. Thus, I conclude there exists no problem of
omitted variables present within the first model.
Next, I construct models which estimate the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables in one of the two eight-year periods, to see if the relationships implied by
the scatterplots and correlation coefficients hold true that there are differing impacts on the
relationship between ICT investment and employment which are dependent on the eight-year
period investigated. My first model utilized data only during the 1991-1999, and the results
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demonstrated a strongly significant and positive correlation between the two variables with a
correlation coefficient of 0.566. The results of the 2000-2007 model, however, were negative and
insignificant, even at the 10% level. Thus, the models demonstrate that the gains from ICT
investment were to be made during the 1990s but did not last not through the 2000s, when the
overall employment population ratio tumbled due to the 2001 recession.
Finally, I construct three models to allocate the 27 broad sector industries in each
commuting zone into three categories: ICT intensive investment, moderate ICT intensive
investment, and non-ICT intensive investment. From the year-commuting zone-industry stage of
my data manipulation, I identify the top 9 industries by computing the simple average of the
average ICT investment over the two periods, constructing one value from 1991-2007. Then, I
compute the total employment in each commuter zone for each bracket, leaving 6,498
observations and three new variables corresponding to each ICT investment level. Finally, I find
the change in employment for the two periods and drop the 1991 values from the data set. More
information on the industry breakdown and their respective summary statistics can be found in
Tables 5-7.
The results of the three ICT models (Table 4a-c) suggest that increased ICT investment
positively impacts ICT intensive segments while negatively impacting non-ICT intensive
industries. The ICT intensive model demonstrates a positive and strongly significant relationship
between the two variables, suggesting that a one percent increase in ICT investment will increase
expected employment by .42%. This result further demonstrates the complementarity of ICT
investment to the labor market, particularly its addition to ICT intensive industries. On the other
hand, the expected relationship between ICT investment in non-ICT intensive industries and
employment is significant and negative, with a coefficient of -.21%. This disproves the idea that
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the increase in employment in the first model was the result of a substitution effect in non-ICT
intensive industries. The moderate ICT investment model is insignificant, with a near-zero
coefficient that implies no definite relationship between ICT investment and employment. This
coefficient is in line with the results of the other two models because of the complementary
relationship between intensiveness and employment and substitute relationship between nonintensiveness and employment.
However, the results of the three categorical models may indicate an omitted variables
bias problem in the models. If an industry category—ICT intensive, for example—expands,
companies may concurrently hire more employees and invest in ICT. In this case, the
relationship between ICT investment and change in employment would necessarily be causal,
but a response to a third variable which is driving expansion in that sector. Instituting an
additional variable to control for this difference would solve this potential problem, but I could
not conceive of any measurable instruments to utilize in the model. Thus, further research should
attempt to correct for hypothetical bias by using an instrument correlated with ICT investment
and not directly linked with employment in those industries.
I was unable to account for all possible influences on level of commuting zone
employment which could misconstrue the relationship between the dependent variable and
commuter zone ICT investment. Particularly, there is no control for the type of industry
employment or the makeup of commuter zone employment in the first model, and the three
models which consider industries only do so using intensive, moderately intensive, and nonintensive ICT brackets. However, it is unclear whether the addition of this variable would
actually significantly impact the results of the model, and there would exist difficulties in coding
this variable for all industries included in the initial dataset. Additionally, research conducted by
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Autor et al (2015) did not find industry to have a significant impact in their model. Nevertheless,
while the model demonstrates a significant relationship between the dependent and independent
variables, there could exist an omitted variable or variables which impact the findings of the
model.
As ICT investment is a relatively broad category of technology, further research may be
needed to look specifically at the impacts of robotics and possible resulting job automation. In
the creation of this model, ICT investment appears to be an adequate proxy for robotics.
However, it may be that another indicator of robotics development could have been better served
to estimate the model, as it would analyze the funding on specifically technologies which could
be used to automate tasks. Additionally, further research should aim to include a larger number
of years so as to compute both the change in employment and change in investment. This would
allow the model to analyze the impacts of increasing investment in ICT technologies on
employment rather than average level. Using an independent variable measuring its change,
would, regardless of impact, have more straightforward policy implications.
VI.

Concluding Remarks
Job automation and its growth in recent decades have awakened suspicions and

frustrations over their risk of making many traditional jobs obsolete and decreasing employment
opportunities for the newly jobless. Yet, according to the results of the model, this does not seem
to be the case. The findings from this paper challenge my hypothesis of a negative relationship
between the dependent and independent variables, instead suggesting that an increase in the level
of ICT investment within a commuting zone, as a percentage of total investment, would lead to
an increase in the expected employment population ratio in that commuting zone. These results
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are significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.063. Thus, the findings ultimately indicate
that ICT investment leads to increased employment.
From these findings, policy recommendations are less than straightforward; the first
model dictates that increasing ICT investment would push employment in commuter zones, but
due to differences in the two time periods tested and the negative and insignificant coefficient in
the third and fourth models, implications for the current slow growth era may be not be effective.
However, the differences may be due to the 2001 recession and decrease in growth. Thus, further
research is recommended to determine whether periods of slow growth can receive the
employment benefits of ICT investment. This paper does not attempt to define the correct limit
of spending nor does it serve to understand the optimal distribution of ICT investment by
industry. What this paper does, however, is dispel fears of a negative relationship between the
two variables.
The US labor market remains a major source of discussion, particularly as the economy
has been plagued by slow growth. While the official unemployment rate was 4.9% as of October
2016, the labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio remain far below pre2007 levels. A struggling labor market in the aftermath of recession and dramatic rise in
technology have caused many to couple the two together, and fear that technological
developments have contributed to unemployment rates. However, the use of technology appears
to be a scapegoat for other issues putting downward pressure on the labor market. The rise of the
service sector, as noted by Autor and Dorn (2013) has allowed another outlet for American
workers. The results of the models tested in this paper, however, demonstrate a complementary
relationship between ICT investment and growth in labor opportunities, rather than a substitution
effect of workers moving from ICT-intensive industries to non-ICT intensive sectors. Thus, the
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public should embrace—rather than fear—information and communication technology
investment as a way in which to spur growth and expand labor market opportunities.
VII.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary of Variables
Variable

Description

Observations

Source

Employment

Employment within czone as

1444 observations

Autor et al.

percentage of total employment

1999, 2007

Average level of ICT investment as

1444 observations

percentage of total investment over

1992-1999, 2000-2007

ICT Investment

EU KLEMS

eight year periods
Year

Dummy variable representing either

1444 observations

1999 (‘0’) or 2007 (‘1’)

1999, 2007

New England

Dummy variable representing New

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

England czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

Mid-Atlantic

Dummy variable representing Mid-

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

Atlantic czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

East North Central

Dummy variable representing East

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

North Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

West North

Dummy variable representing West

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Central Division

North Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

East South Central

Dummy variable representing East

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

South Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

West South

Dummy variable representing West

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Central Division

South Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns
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Autor et al/EU KLEMS

Pacific Division

Dummy variable representing

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Pacific czones.

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

Table 2: Summary of Independent and Dependent Variables by Year

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

ICT investment 1991-1999

14.32083

.28453

9.5747

20.0174

ICT investment 2000-2007

16.21238

1.396903

9.9275

23.2145

Change in employment,

5.90318

4.114131

-9.162831

27.81029

.2150155

4.606847

-23.85641

22.99899

1991-1999

Change in Employment,
2000-2007

Table 3: Regression Analysis: ICT Investment Across All Levels
Variable

(a) OLS regression
Change in
commuting zone
employment

(b) OLS regression
Change in
commuting zone
employment
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(c) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment in
1999

(d) OLS regression
Change in
commuting zone
employment in 2007

IT investment in
commuting zone

.167
(.090)

.160
(.089)

Year

6.01***
(.279)

5.407***
(.287)

Import
penetration

.566***
(.124)

-.116
(.119)

-.971***
(.136)

New England

-1.67*
(.813)

-1.049
(.804)

.833
(1.051)

-4.251***
1.126

Mid Atlantic

-3.201***
(.678)

-2.389***
(.676)

-3.292***
(.878)

-3.253**
(.938)

South Atlantic

-3.152***
(.419)

-2.443***
(.424)

-.732
(.542)

-5.572***
(.580)

East North
Central

-2.728***
(.456)

-2.017***
(.459)

.753
(.592)

-6.343***
(.629)

West North
Central

-.239
(.400)

.181
(.398)

1.142*
(.525)

-1.840**
(.548)

East South
Central

-2.756***
(.464)

-1.439**
(.493)

-.384
(.600)

-5.141***
(.643)

West South
Central

-1.471***
(.418)

-1.080**
(.415)

-1.317*
(.542)

-1.735**
(.577)

Pacific

-2.487**
(.541)

-2.279***
(.533)

-2.710***
(.701)

-2.307**
(.749)

Constant

-0.688**
(1.439)

-.213
(1.417)

-1.941
(1.732)

5.224**
(1.896)

N
R2

1444
.358

1444
.380

721
0.142

722
0.218

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

21

Table 4: Regression Analysis: ICT Investment Across All Levels
(a) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment for
high ICT industries

(b) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment for
mid ICT industries

(c) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment for
low ICT industries

IT investment in
commuting zone

.425***
(.060)

-.056
(.041)

-.209***
(.0459)

Year

3.773***
(.185)

1.77***
(.129)

.456***
(.142)

New England

-1.214*
(.539)

-.373
(.375)

-.128
(.413)

Mid Atlantic

-1.978***
(.449)

-.965**
(.313)

-.317
(.345)

South Atlantic

-.868**
(.278)

-.719***
(.193)

-1.560***
(.213)

East North Central

-1.704***
(.302)

-1.106***
(.210)

.115
(.232)

West North Central

-.928***
(.265)

.171
(.185)

.558**
(.203)

East South Central

-1.223***
(.308)

-.422*
(.214)

-1.098***
(.236)

West South Central

-1.163***
(.277)

-.449*
(.193)

.143
(.212)

Pacific

-1.087**
(.359)

-.871***
(.250)

-.484
(.274)

Constant

-5.77***
(.953)

1.561*
(.664)

3.459
(.731)

N
R2

1444
.257

1444
.225

1444
0.137

Variable

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 5: ICT Level Industry Breakdown: ICT Intensive Industries

ICT-Intensive Industry
Name

Transport and storage
Education
Electrical and optical
equipment
Machinery, nec
Financial intermediation
Wholesale trade and
commission trade
Transport equipment
Construction
Community social and
personal services

Broad
Sector
Code

Average ICT
Investment, 19911999

Average ICT
Investment, 20002007

Average ICT
Investment, 19912007

26

0.229

0.374

0.360

35

0.300

0.349

0.344

15

0.238

0.345

0.335

14

0.244

0.308

0.302

29

0.297

0.248

0.253

22

0.226

0.246

0.244

16

0.204

0.239

0.235

19

0.138

0.205

0.198

33

0.165

0.178

0.176
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Table 6: ICT Level Industry Breakdown: Moderate ICT Intensive Industries

Broad
Sector
Code

Average ICT
Investment, 19911999

Average ICT
Investment, 20002007

Average ICT
Investment, 19912007

7

0.132

0.170

0.166

Manufacturing nec;
recycling

17

0.163

0.166

0.166

Health and social work

36

0.149

0.153

0.152

Chemicals and chemical
products

10

0.135

0.146

0.145

Retail trade, repair of
household goods

23

0.124

0.132

0.131

21

0.129

0.115

0.117

13

0.101

0.102

0.102

Coke, refined petroleum
and nuclear fuel

9

0.097

0.099

0.099

Other non-metallic
mineral

12

0.089

0.094

0.093

Moderate ICT Industry
Name
Pulp, paper, paper,
printing and publishing

Sale, maintenance and
repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles
Basic metals and
fabricated metal
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Table 7:: ICT Level Industry Breakdown: non-ICT Intensive Industries

Non-ICT Intensive
Industry Name

Broad
Sector
Code

Average ICT
Investment, 19911999

Average ICT
Investment, 20002007

Average ICT
Investment, 19912007

Food, beverages and
tobacco

4

0.076

0.091

0.090

Textiles, textile, leather
and footwear

5

0.065

0.091

0.088

Real estate, renting and
business activities

30

0.068

0.073

0.072

Electricity, gas and water
supply

18

0.062

0.070

0.069

Wood and of wood and
cork

6

0.059

0.066

0.065

11

0.045

0.061

0.059

24

0.044

0.050

0.049

2

0.061

0.040

0.042

1

0.014

0.018

0.018

Rubber and plastics
Hotels and restaurants
Mining and quarrying
Agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
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